1. Today I will speak about one of the key threats that Singapore faces – the threat of a terror attack and quite importantly, what we are going to do about it. We can keep talking about threats but how are we going to act? We have been giving that some thought.
2. I would like to credit the National Security Coordination Secretariat for their publication “Terrorism Year in Review”, which I have referred to extensively in preparing this speech.
3. Over several years, the terror threat has been growing and we have taken that threat very seriously. We have enacted tough laws. We have enforced strict gun controls. We have upgraded border security and we have strengthened Home Team Departments and other security agencies to prevent, detect and respond to these attacks. And we work closely with our foreign security partners.
4. But security responses alone are not enough. We have never seen them as being enough in themselves. We have to work the ground. So, we work in close partnership with religious and community groups within Singapore to counter extremist ideology at source, to really inoculate our community from radical extremism and try to preserve our way of life and our social fabric. And these efforts have served us well so far.
II. The Threat has increased significantly
5. But, in 2015, we saw the terror threat morph into a very different, newer, much more powerful large monster. It is now a qualitatively different and much more dangerous threat. ISIS presents a far graver threat than Al Qaeda and its affiliates ever were.
6. In 2015, there were at least 56 attacks that were directed or inspired by ISIS, outside of Iraq and Syria. And in Iraq or Syria, we don’t even need to talk about it. Many of these attacks targeted civilians – quite worrying. In 2016 alone, there were the following terror attacks. Many of these were ISIS-inspired, some of these were Al Qaeda-inspired, but the same sort of ideology.
A suicide vehicle bomb attack at a coastguard training camp in Zliten, Libya, that killed at least 67 people (7 January 2016).
A stabbing attack on tourists at a hotel in Egypt by apparent ISIS supporters (8 January 2016),
A suicide bombing near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey that killed ten Germans (12 January 2016).
The Jakarta attacks that were said to be carried out by ISIS supporters (14 January 2016).
The suicide bombing and shooting at a Shi’ite mosque in Saudi Arabia that killed at least four (29 January 2016);
The numerous Al-Shabab attacks in Somalia (January to February 2016).
More recently, the shootings at a popular beach resort in Ivory Coast that killed at least 16, and is reported to be linked to Al-Qaeda (13 March 2016).
7. ISIS poses a threat that is unlike many other terrorist organisations. ISIS controls large territories and oil resources, hundreds of millions of dollars in income. In fact, before the airstrikes, ISIS was reportedly earning USD 1.5 million per day on oil. It controls territories and populations from which fighters can be recruited. It is extremely skilful in the use of social media and has recruited more than 30,000 foreign fighters from all around the world, including this region and including Singapore.
8. It has used religion as an effective tool. It builds up hatred, anger against perceived injustices, makes people believe that God wants them to kill; they need to go out and kill in the name of God. It has expanded globally by establishing ‘wilayats’ – provinces. It now has a presence, along those lines, in at least nine countries.
9. In scale, network, finances, propaganda, ISIS is at a different level and sophistic-ation, compared with other terrorist groups.
III. The Threat to Singapore
10. What does the rise of ISIS mean for us in Singapore and how real is the threat? The threat of a terror attack here is at its highest level in recent times, much more so than after 9/11 and the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah members. Why do I say this? We have to assess the threat by considering at least three things: (a) What ISIS wants to do; (b) What is happening in the region; (c) What is happening within Singapore.
A. What ISIS wants to do
11. ISIS wants to establish a caliphate in the region, encompassing Singapore. It opposes democratic elections. In territories that it controls, non-Muslim lives are not worth very much. Women are sex slaves, bought and sold. Women as young as 8, 9, 10 and 14 years old. Men are slaves, killed at whim. Muslims who do not share the same ideology are subject to the same regiment. We are in the epicentre of the caliphate that ISIS wants to establish in this region.
B. What is happening in the region
12. Let us now look at what is happening in the region. In my speech on 19 January 2016 at the SRP Distinguished Lecture & Symposium, I set out fairly extensively, the political backdrop in the region and how that is leading us to increasing extremism. I do not propose to repeat the points. I have summarised them as an Annex to my speech.
13. We have to keep that political backdrop because when politics fails, then everything else fails, and that is unfortunately happening. But, as you keep that political background in mind, we can then see how the terror threat in the region is growing. I will sketch out the situation in a few countries and some groups which are non-country specific.
14. First, we will look at Malaysia. In 2015, there were more than 100 arrests of persons suspected to have ISIS links. Four of them were Commandos, highly trained in military skills. There were Police officers being arrested, civil servants being arrested and suggestions of people in extremely sensitive positions being arrested. Malaysia’s Special Branch has said that seven terrorist plots were foiled in 2015. One of them was at an advanced stage of planning. There was even a plot to kidnap the Prime Minister. Recently, in September 2015, the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur issued a terror alert on a possible terror attack near Bukit Bintang. In January 2016, Malaysia detained a potential suicide bomber just hours before the attack. Few more hours and the attack would have been successful.
15. In Malaysia, there is also a substantial threat posed by ‘clean skins’, people with no criminal records and not under the scrutiny of security agencies. They come together through social media. In April last year, Malaysia arrested 12 militants, all clean skins. If they wanted to travel, they could get past many immigration counters undetected.
16. Every day, we have more than 400,000 persons crossing both ways at our land checkpoints in Woodlands and Tuas. In Woodlands alone, we have about 90,000 travellers via motorcycles and 80,000 travellers via cars, every single day. So you can work out for yourself, the nature of the threat to us, from a would-be terrorist in Malaysia. When we complain about jams, one has got to take it in perspective but it is very difficult to bring this point across to the broader public. The checks are necessary.
17. In Indonesia, in 2015, there were at least 74 terror-related arrests. Nine plots had been foiled in 2015 and there was the Jakarta attack in January this year. Some of the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia are coming together under the banner of Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK). There are other groups, which are outside JAK, which are now competing for attention, significantly increasing the possibility of one-upmanship attacks. The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network in Indonesia also seems to be reviving. In December 2015, Indonesia announced that it had arrested four JI linked operatives. They had guns, bomb making material and ‘jihad’ material when they were arrested.
18. The situation is made worse by a number of factors. First, Indonesian security forces are hampered by the lack of adequate security legislation. The National Police itself has come out and said this. The Indonesians have said that they will strengthen the legislation but that is going to take time. And until that is done, there is a big lacuna. What does that mean? It’s not a crime in Indonesia if you wanted to join ISIS. It is not a crime if you have violent tendencies.
19. The four Indonesians that ICA had picked up, there was nothing to suggest that they were would-be terrorists but they had wanted to come through Singapore and go on to Syria. A sharp ICA officer picked up that something was wrong with them. We arrested them, we handed them over to the Indonesians and the Indonesians then released them because they can’t hold them.
20. By the end of this year, 150 persons in Indonesian prisons for terror-related offences will be released. They are not yet de-radicalised. They cannot be held, like how we can hold people under the ISA. So what do we have, we have three streams of supply of terrorists. One, of course, homegrown terrorists whom, until they actively do something, cannot be arrested. You have a second group, the prisoners who are going to be released and there is a third group, the people who are going to return from Syria and Iraq and cannot be arrested under Indonesian laws. These three groups are all coalescing in Indonesia.
c) Returnees from Syria/Iraq
21. If we look at the returnees from Syria and Iraq, there are, an estimated about 1,000, from South East Asia, mainly from Indonesia and Malaysia, who have gone to Syria, Iraq to fight for ISIS. They are battle hardened with combat skills, violent tendencies and extremist ideology. They are willing to die. When they come back, obviously they will pose a significant risk.
22. A group of them in Syria/Iraq have formed the “Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah” or Malay Archipelago Unit for ISIS. The group actively recruits new fighters through slick, evocative videos, in Bahasa Melayu and Indonesian. ISIS propaganda has painted the Katibah Nusantara as being successful militarily. This in turn attracts even more recruits.
23. Katibah Nusantara has sent a video warning to Malaysia, threatening revenge for the arrests of its members. The message is titled “Mesej Awam Kepada Malaysia” or “Public Message for Malaysia”. The video warns: “If you catch us, we will only increase in number. But if you let us be, we will be closer to our goal of bringing back the rule of the Khalifah (caliph). We will never bow down to the democratic system of governance as we will only follow Allah’s rules.”
24. ”Allah’s rules” as interpreted by them, means you cannot have the system of governance as you have in Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia. They want to destroy what there is and replace with what there is in Iraq and Syria, and in territories in control by them. The militants in Syria and Iraq are also actively encouraging militants in this region to launch attacks. For example, Bahrun Naim, who is well-known to the security agencies, is said to have encouraged attacks in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. As of late 2015, at least 100 Indonesians had returned from Syria, another 200 had been deported by Turkey, and not allowed to cross into Syria.
25. The returnees are in Indonesia, free, because, as I said earlier, they can’t be arrested. So you have three categories: home grown radicals, released prisoners, and returnees (numbering several hundreds). All with intent of perpetrating violence, terror and furthering the cause of ISIS.
C. The rest of the region
26. We should also look briefly at the rest of the region. In Thailand, there was the Erawan Shrine Bombing in August 2015. There have been a number of other bombings in tourist sites – Siam Paragon (Bangkok; February 2015) and Koh Samui (April 2015).
27. In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group continues to be active. Throughout 2015, there have been terrorist incidents in the Philippines. For example, the kidnapping of four persons in September 2015 and the beheading in November 2015, as illustrations of what’s happening.
28. Some Philippines and Malaysian militants based in south Philippines are said to have pledged allegiance to ISIS and ISIS is said to have accepted the pledge. That could make the situation worse because a wilayat (province) could be established in south Philippines.
29. Extremist Uighur militants also pose a significant threat in Southeast Asia. They are believed to have linked up with militant networks in Southeast Asia. They were involved in the Erawan attack. Four Uighurs were arrested while trying to link up with MIT (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur) in Indonesia. According to estimates, there could be as many as 3,500 Uighurs in Syria/Iraq, actively fighting.
30. Groups sympathetic to the perceived mistreatment of Uighurs in China could target Chinese interests in Southeast Asia. This has already happened in Turkey where the Thai consulate was attacked after Thailand deported 109 Uighurs to China in July 2015. Then there is the Rohingya Issue, which also has potential security implications. There are as many as 100,000 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia and 120,000 Rohingya refugees in Thailand, in camps. They are vulnerable to radicalisation. ISIS has now specifically targeted them. Retaliatory attacks on Myanmarese interests have already been attempted. Buddhists could be an obvious target.
31. As can be seen, we do not have a pretty picture. There are multiple layers of threats in this region – complex, interwoven, fusing religion with domestic political grievances, ranging from Myanmar to Indonesia. And we are in the middle, an oasis of calm, and a prime target for all. Let me now turn to specific threats to Singapore.
D. Threats within Singapore
32. There are at least four possible types of threats. First, attacks that can be planned just outside and then they come in and carry out the attacks here. That is what happened in Paris. The attacks were planned in Molenbeek, in Belgium. We have several possible Molenbeeks around us. 200 million people pass through both ways, our checkpoints, including air and sea checkpoints. 145 million of them pass through our two land checkpoints, per year.
33. The second threat, are the attacks involving weapons which could be smuggled across from just outside, for use by Singaporeans. This is why the checks at our checkpoints have to be very, very stringent. You can’t trade security for convenience. The third threat is that of a lone wolf attack by self-radicalised individuals, which perhaps, because security at our checkpoints is quite tight, lone wolf attacks become a higher possibility. The fourth threat is foreign workers in Singapore who can get radicalised.
34. These threats are real. The arrests and deportation of the 27 Bangladeshis has brought home the message to many Singaporeans on the nature of the threat. This week, we announced the detention of two Singaporeans who had participated in the armed sectarian conflict in Yemen, carrying weapons and taking part in the conflict. We also issued Restriction Orders against a Singaporean who had performed armed sentry duty in Yemen, and another who had intended to fight with the Kurds in full battle fatigues.
35. I will now say a little more about the threats from self-radicalisation. There has been a noticeable rise in lone wolf attacks throughout the world. The call for lone wolf attacks came from an ISIS spokesman Adnani, who gave a message in September 2014. He told followers to carry out attacks in any way, however it may be.
36. Six attacks took place in 2014 after Adnani’s statement. 11 more attacks took place in 2015. These are recorded attacks. The numbers exclude foiled attacks and if you add the two together, it is quite alarming. Adnani told followers: If you cannot find an IED or guns, then smash people’s heads with a rock, slaughter them with a knife, run them down with a car, throw them down from a high place, choke them. Security checks at Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints are not going to prevent these. This is serious.
37. The nature of attacks has become “simpler”. People have begun to use knifes, machetes; items which are easily accessible to people. This is a nightmare for every security agency, including the Home Team.
38. We have had a small number of self-radicalised individuals. In 2015, we detained four persons under the ISA and issued a Restriction Order for a fifth person. All five were radicalised by the rhetoric they read online. They wanted to engage in armed violence for ISIS. The influence of radical material on our young people is something that concerns us. Among the five, three were teenagers. Young people are internet-savvy and they are also less able to discern right from wrong. They can easily succumb to the seductive attractiveness of ISIS’s messages.
39. This is the landscape. It is no longer a question of whether an attack will take place, but really, when is an attack going to take place in Singapore and we have to be prepared for that. It is not a question of whether. The critical task for MHA is really to deal with this in the coming years. I will now turn to our Response.
IV. Our Response
40. I will deal with our Response in two categories – (i) the security response that is needed; and (ii) the community response that is needed.
A. The Security Response
41. The attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and in Jakarta on 14 January 2016 have shown a different, more dangerous Modus Operandi. These were multi-shooter attacks staged almost simultaneously over different locations. Second, the targets were crowded places where people congregate, with little or no security protection, like restaurants, a sports stadium, concert hall, shopping malls. Third, in Paris, the attackers took hostages, not to negotiate but to inflict maximum casualties.
42. The intent of such attacks is to achieve high, maximum public visibility, inflict maximum damage and create a climate of fear. Beyond the loss of lives, the attackers wanted to destroy the psychological resilience and social fabric of local communities. They wanted to divide and tear apart communities.
43. We have in place a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which has dealt with the challenges so far and quite effectively. Now we have to deal with an increased set of threats and deal with a new modus operandi. And, there is no time to waste. We have to do this urgently. We have to and will significantly enhance measures in two areas: security protection & vigilance and security response.
a) Security Protection & Vigilance
44. First, we will further enhance protective security measures for buildings and premises. These include critical infrastructure like Changi Airport and government buildings, and also soft targets, like entertainment centres, sports facilities and shopping centres.
45. Security vigilance will be substantially enhanced through a significant expansion of CCTV coverage. The enhanced CCTV coverage will give us three significant advantages in our fight against terrorism: (i) greater deterrence via police cameras at HDB blocks and other places; (ii) it will give Police a better sense-making; and (iii) situational awareness. This is critical.
46. The Home Team will develop deep data analytical capabilities to allow real-time monitoring and analysis of the CCTV data. This will allow us to plan and execute our responses much more incisively. The footage will also help us identify the perpetrators, shorten the time taken to apprehend them and prevent them from launching more attacks.
47. We will complete the installation of Police cameras at 10,000 HDB resident blocks and multi-storey car parks this year. We will then move to cover common areas in the heartlands, especially areas with high human traffic such as town centres, hawker centres, walkways linking up to major transportation nodes. Phased installation of cameras will start later this year. It will be completed progressively over the next four years. Beyond Police cameras, there are other data that we can make better use of. This includes existing CCTVs island-wide.
48. We will set up the network infrastructure to allow CCTV data in more areas to be accessible to the Police, on-demand. These include CCTVs monitoring the public transportation system, commercial buildings with high footfall and Government buildings. I will speak about this in Parliament, at some point, soon. Police will work closely with premises owners to allow Police access to their CCTVs. Members of public will also be able to submit videos to the Police on crowdsourcing platforms.
49. This is a necessary, strategic, and direct response to the evolving nature of the threats.
50. Second, we will, where necessary, enact legislation, rules to require premises owners and organisers of major events to put in place necessary security measures. For example, MHA will engage developers of large scale building projects which are likely to have high volume of human traffic to factor in new security considerations at the design stage. Premises owners could be asked to put in place CCTV systems that meet baseline technical standards. We will also look at existing buildings. At major events, organisers may be, will be asked to screen persons before they enter the venue. During periods of heightened security alert, these measures will be enhanced.
51. There are good reasons for requiring these measures. Terrorist attacks in other places have focused on soft targets because there was little or no security protection. We need to do more, to partner with the private and people sectors to better protect these soft targets. In Paris at Stade de France, strict security checks were conducted by competent personnel at the entrances. Three would-be suicide bombers who wanted to go into the stadium were deterred by the checks, so their bombs went off outside. Imagine the consequences if they had managed to get into the stadium and then exploded themselves.
52. In the Jakarta attacks, the primary target appears not have been the Sarinah Mall. They apparently were targeting a larger mall nearby but that mall had tight screening measures. They were deterred by that and went to the Sarinah Mall. If that larger mall did not have security measures, the impact of the attack would have been more devastating.
53. The proposed increased security measures will increase building and operating costs. This unfortunately cannot be avoided. The terrorists have imposed multiple costs on society ranging from increased costs due to heightened security measures, to the costs to the social fabric.
54. The Home Team will work with premises owners and event organisers to safeguard the security of the people who patronise their premises and attend their events. For visitors, there will be more inconvenience. We will all need to get used to more security and bag checks prior to entry.
55. But I believe that our people will understand and accept the need for these measures.
b) Security Response
56. These are preventive, protective measures that we intend to put in place with necessary legislation. But we must assume that even with all these measures, some attacks will get through, so we will also enhance our ability to respond to these attacks. When an attack takes place, the speed and the manner in which we respond, will be critical in taking down the attackers and limiting the damage.
57. The Home Team has studied the recent attacks. We will upgrade our capabilities and modify our operational set-up so that we can better deal with these challenges. It is critical for our security forces to arrive quickly – the current norms have to change, and they must have the capacity to take down the attackers, which means enhancing the numbers. These forces must be mentally prepared, tactically well trained, and well equipped to react quickly to the situation.
58. The Paris attacks revealed the challenges in dealing with armed violence staged at multiple locations. Paris had well-trained frontline responders and specialised units. Even then, post-incident analysis showed that there were substantial periods when the terrorists operated with little or no hindrance. One officer arrived at the Bataclan concert hall 15 minutes into the attack. He managed to stall the killing by shooting one attacker. But this officer was then ordered to withdraw in favour of a more specialised anti-terrorism unit, that unit arrived half an hour into the assault. By that time, the killing was effectively over. The specialised anti-terrorism unit initially headed towards restaurants on the Rue de Charonne where the killing had ended more than 20 minutes before that.
59. Police have studied these shootings. We will reorganise the Police response forces to a terrorist incident, enhance their firepower and operational capability, and deploy them in a way so that they can arrive faster at any location in Singapore. This is going to be absolutely critical to deal with the mode of terrorist attacks where the aim of the attackers is to kill as many people as they can and inflict maximum damage and fear.
60. We will form new Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) to respond quickly, engage the attackers and minimise the casualties. This means increasing the number of personnel and the ERTs. We have to increase the number of police officers to be trained. They will be specially trained with counter-assault skills and equipped with the necessary weapons. Day to day, they will patrol the terrain and engage stakeholders to build familiarity with the areas they will be in-charge of. The aim is to significantly upgrade our immediate response capability.
61. We will also enhance the response of the second wave of forces. These are the specialist teams from the Special Operations Command and the Gurkha Contingent. They will be enabled to arrive at the scene faster. On top of this, the Home Team will also work more closely with the SAF to deal with the threat, where necessary.
B. Community Response
62. So far, I have talked about the security response in two aspects – protective security and the other, our response. Next, let me talk about community response. Our ability to deal with terrorism effectively as a country depends on how many Singaporeans face up to, and respond, to this challenge as individuals and as members of the community. I mentioned earlier that the aim of the attackers is to inflict maximum fear and casualties and divide society. This is why the cornerstone of a counter-terrorism strategy has to be a community response plan – one that enhances community vigilance, community cohesion and community resilience.
63. This is not a completely new strategy. After the London incidents of July 2005, we introduced the Community Engagement Programme (CEP). This was to ensure that we were better equipped to maintain social cohesion and unity should an attack take place. Just stay united in a crisis.
64. Over the years, through the CEP, we have built networks of community leaders and influencers. They have helped strengthen the understanding and ties between different races and religions. These are networks that can be activated when a crisis occurs. For example, after the Paris attacks, customised messages were disseminated through these networks.
65. Given today’s threat environment, we will have to revamp the CEP considerably. There is a strong, urgent need for the community to be vigilant before and during an attack. A community that knows how to respond, a community that is prepared and equipped with the necessary skills to protect themselves, their families and the community.
a) SG SECURE
66. With these considerations in mind, the Home Team will develop and launch a new national programme, which we will call “SG Secure”. SG Secure will represent our national strategy to safeguard our homeland and our way of life against this threat. Just as we have “Total Defence”, which involves every Singaporean playing a part for the defence of Singapore, SG Secure must become a rallying call for Singaporeans from all walks of life to unite, to play a part in making Singapore a safe place that it is today.
67. It has to be a new national movement to sensitise, organise, train, and exercise Singaporeans, so that we can better protect ourselves from attacks. SG Secure cannot just another public awareness campaign. It has to be a call to action. It has to be a movement.
68. We have to execute this in a systematic, structured and sustained manner and I don’t underestimate the difficulties. Training up our own forces, increasing the numbers that we have, increasing the number of ERTs, getting building premises owners to put in measures, all these we can do through legislation, through effort. But getting the community together in this new movement is a different ball game and it is not going to be easy. But we have to try and we have to do it. It can only be achieved if we can get everyone to participate. It will take time and resources from all in society. But it has to be done, to keep Singapore safe and secure.
69. We will reach out to Singaporeans in neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces, the NS community, and community groups. We will work with partners to develop or enhance programmes to sensitise, train and mobilise different groups of Singaporeans
70. They will be empowered and enabled to:
Stay Alert – Be vigilant and alert to unusual behaviour or items in their surroundings, know how to respond and protect themselves, their family and their friends;
Stay United – Cherish and safeguard Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious social fabric; and
Stay Strong – Be ready to deal with crisis if they occur, be resilient as individuals and as a community, help each other bounce back quickly and overcome adversity.
71. There is another aspect to the community response, to which we have to pay a lot of attention and work with some of the other agencies and ministries, and that relates to, not the cases of self-radicalisation but the causes of self-radicalisation, including the influence of preachers, whether local or foreign, who advocate intolerance, and the influences from online, and how we can inoculate Singaporeans against these trends. We will pay a lot of attention to that as well. None of these is going to be easy.
72. The Home Team will roll-out SG Secure, together with our partners, later this year. We will urge all Singaporeans to come on board and take an active role in this programme: (i) to understand the security landscape and the threats that we face; (ii) to be equipped with right skills; and (iii) to help spread the messages of vigilance, cohesion and resilience to friends, families and colleagues. There will be emergency preparedness exercises; we will have to get them upgraded significantly from where they are now.
73. So if an attack occurs, we need to be able to recover well. The day after is even more important. We have to emerge stronger, more united and more determined as Singaporeans. If we looked at what happened in Paris and Jakarta, after the Paris attacks, social media users posted the hashtag #PorteOuverte, which means ‘open door’, to offer shelter and help to those on the streets with nowhere to go. It was organic and a ground-up response – overwhelming. After the Jakarta attacks, Indonesians started tweeting #KamiTidakTakut, which means ‘we are not afraid’. This goes back to the heart of the issue. The terrorists wanted to spread fear and alarm and the population responds – we open our doors to strangers because they have nowhere to go; we tell the attackers that we are not afraid; we will fight back. That is what we need. We must have that same spirit in Singapore.
74. The terrorism threat to us is real. We will take all precautions to prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in Singapore. We, the Home Team agencies, will do their utmost. We hope we never have an attack but if an attack occurs, we have to prepare Singaporeans with psychological and other skills, to come together and emerge stronger.
75. A Singapore that is even more united and determined to safeguard our way of life, our racial and religious harmony. A Singapore, where every Singaporean knows that he or she can rely on fellow countrymen. This is how we must be able to respond to terrorism.
76. The fight ultimately is one between Freedom and Terror; a fight between Liberty and Servitude; a fight between the spirit of Humanity and the forces of Darkness; or very simply, a fight between Good and Evil. I don’t believe that the terrorists will ever win in the longer term. We must believe that we can never be kept down by terror. Liberty, Freedom and the Human Spirit will ultimately succeed. But we have to be prepared to fight for it.